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Economics (LSE), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw).
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by academics and policy makers from all the countries in the region, from a number of
EU countries, from the European Commission, the USA and Russia. Based on ideas and
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and the wiiw. The paper was presented at a follow-up meeting on Reconstruction and
Integration in Southeast Europe in Vienna on 12-13 November 1999, which focused on
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Development Network Southeast Europe (GDN-SEE) project, which is based on an
initiative by The World Bank with financial support from the Austrian Ministry of
Finance and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The purpose of the GDN-SEE project
is the creation of research networks throughout Southeast Europe in order to enhance
the economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to build new research capacities by
mobilising young researchers, to promote knowledge transfer into the region, to
facilitate networking between researchers within the region, and to assist in securing
knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. The wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series is one way to achieve these objectives. 
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     The Case of Macedonia
I. Trade Potential and Comparative Advantages
Introduction
The analysis of Macedonian trade potential and competitive advantages on the markets of the
SEE, EU and CEFTA markets is biased by two separate issues: (1) the historic, political and
economic background; and (2) the methodology of analysis.
1. Foreign trade relations among SEE countries have traditionally been relatively week, as is
indicated by data on Tables 1 and 2 in the annex. During 1981-1987 all then existing SEE
countries except Albania mutually exchanged on average less than 5% of their foreign trade.
Meanwhile, all of them had significantly larger scope of foreign trade with more distant
economies, AND with directions primarily dependent on political attitude: ex-socialist SEE
countries had largest trade with the "east bloc", while the non-socialist SEE countries traded
with the "west bloc". During that period, 5 of the SEE countries that exist today were an
integral part of former Yugoslavia, and within that framework their mutual trade, which after
1990 became foreign trade, was very intense. These facts, as well as the results of other
research, allow the following conclusions:
•  the political relations traditionally determined the basis, scope and directions of the
economic cooperation among SEE countries;
 
•  SEE economies are competitive parts of the regional economic entity, since their factor
endowments are similar. In such environment foreign trade specialization based on
comparative advantages creates week potential for bilateral and multilateral foreign trade.
 
  After 1990 the political changes in some of the SEE countries wipe out the traditional barriers
which, accompanied by the foreign trade regionalization trend, derives the current (at least
rhetorically expressed) interest for intensifying foreign trade. Yet, the questions on the
economic issues of that process remain open. This analysis has to tackle some of those issues,
considering the case of Macedonia.
 
  2. From methodological point of view, the analysis is based on the following:
 
•  export structure is analyzed desegregating exports to 5
th-digit level according to the
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), observed as value (USD/product)
and as unit value (USD/kgr/product);2
•  comparative advantages are revealed through the "revealed comparative advantages"
(RCA) indicator;
•  export product specialization is analyzed with standard "GL-index";
•  product and market segmentation analysis is done using methodology of the Austrian
Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) and Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic
Studies (WIIW) [see: Aiginger, 1998, p.98];
•  product technology classes analysis is done using methodology proposed by Legler/
Schulmeister, used also by the above mentioned Institutes [see: Woflmayr-Schnitzer,
1998, p. 44-48];
•  exports labor quality analysis is performed through taxonomy used in the analyses of EU
[see: The Competitiveness of European Industry 1999 Report, p. 56 and 66].
 
  In the 1990-2000 period the foreign economic trends of Macedonia were very unstable, as is
verified by data on Chart 1 in the annex. During the whole period, and especially until end of
1995 (during UN sanctions towards FRY and Greek embargo to Macedonia) as well as in
1999 (during Kosovo war), Macedonian economy exhibits highly unstable foreign economic
trends. All until 1995 large amounts of certain products - copper, chairs, raspberries,
blackberries, blueberries and so on - which are scarcely produced in Macedonia were
evidenced as exports. Their origin was FRY, and they were only exported as Macedonian
exports [source: Export Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia. Macedonian Academy of
Arts and Sciences, 1999, p. 45]. The export/import balance of 1992 is result of enormous
decrease in imports, (a trend during the entire 1990-1993 period), but not result of increase in
exports. This justifies the fact that Macedonian foreign trade relations analysis has to be
performed very carefully. Any latest analysis can only verify the stated facts and not bring to
reliable long-term conclusions.
 
  Hence, the most appropriate methodological approach appears to be the selection of one year
between 1995 and 2000 as rational and representative target. Analyzing the foreign trade
characteristics in that particular year means discovering the correct long term determinants of
Macedonian foreign trade. Such approach is accepted in this paper, with 1997 being
considered as the adequate year. This selection bears wide and thorough argumentation that
the trends precisely during 1997 can be considered as representative, due to various reasons.
Trends after 1997, in fact after 1999/2000, and in the case of MACEDONIA especially
during 2001, can not bring to deeper change in conclusion's suitability.
 
 
  Export competitiveness of Macedonia on SEE, EU and CEFTA markets
 
  1. The starting point of Macedonian export competitiveness analysis is the market structure of
foreign trade, presented on Chart 2 in the annex. That data leads to several interesting
conclusions.
 
•  In 1997 Macedonia exported:3
  (a) 46% of total exports to "wide SEE region", which included 31% to "narrow SEE
region" and 15% to the rest SEE countries
1);
  (b) 49% of the total exports to OECD member states, among which are all EU countries
in which Macedonia exported 38% of total exports;
  (c) 0.5% to CEFTA countries (without Slovenia and Hungary which are considered
among "wide SEE region" countries in this analysis);
  (d) 2% to EEC countries and the rest of the World together.
 
•  Considering the import market structure the picture is not identical and, most notably, in
Macedonian import market structure EEC and rest of the World countries have higher
portion - 22%. The differences in export and import structures reveal Macedonian high
dependence on imports of oil from EEC and Arab countries (evidenced here as "rest of
the World"), as well as the weak domestic potential to absorb technology intensive
products (equipment) originating from EU and OECD countries. In relation to CEFTA
countries, (without Slovenia and Hungary), Macedonia has neglectable foreign trade -
imports as well as exports.
 
•  On the markets of the "narrow SEE region" Macedonia is net exporter, and this is due
solely to the surplus in the trade with FRY. FRY is the market that absorbs most
Macedonian export products in terms of number, and holds second or third place as
market that absorbs Macedonian exports in terms of value. Macedonia also has surplus
in the trade with Albania and Bosnia. Yet, in the foreign trade relations with rest of the
countries here considered as "narrow SEE region" (Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania), as
well as in the trade relations with all countries of the "wide SEE region" (Greece,
Hungary, Slovenia and Turkey), Macedonia has trade deficit. Hence, the overall trade
balance with SEE countries is negative.
 
•  The foreign trade of Macedonia with EU and OECD countries in 1997 is characterized
by small surplus of exports over imports. As it was pointed out, Macedonian domestic
market is not capable to absorb imports of technology intensive products originating from
EU and OECD countries.
 
  2. Chart 3 in the annex shows a segregation of Macedonian exports into two large product
groups: (a) products classified in digits 0 to 4 by SITC - natural resources based products:
agricultural products, raw materials, ores and so on, and (b) products classified in digits 5 to 9
by SITC - manufactures. Both groups are also separated by different regional markets. This
picture points to one peculiarity (or paradox): natural resources based exports of Macedonia
in most part (70%) are directed towards SEE markets, while the exports of manufactures, on
the contrary, in most part (60%) are directed towards EU and OECD markets. This creates
an instant but false conclusion that Macedonian exports are more competitive in the technology
intensive product classes since being sold on competitive markets, and are less competitive in
the resource intensive product classes since being sold on less competitive markets. Yet, this
conclusion, in fact, only highlights the specific foreign trade (non) specialization of Macedonia,
as is explained further on.
                                                                
 
1 "Narrow SEE region" in this study comprises: Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania
and FRY, while "wide SEE region" comprises those countries plus Greece, Hungary, Slovenia and Turkey.4
 
  3. A more detailed insight in Macedonian export competitiveness can be gained through
detecting the industries with revealed competitive advantages (RCA industries) separated by
markets. This is enabled by data on Table 3 in the annex, and brings to the following
conclusions:
 
•  Macedonian "RCA export industries" are found among almost all industries which have
exports, and their share in total export is 90%. This is due to the nearly entire non
specialization and disintegration of Macedonian economy from international markets in
terms of two-sided import-export relations. Since the RCA indicator captures the
relationship between the share of a country's particular export in an industry in total
world export of the same industry compared to the share of the respective country's
import related to the total world import in the same industry, in the case of Macedonia
the high RCA indexes for exports in certain industries are derived primarily due to the
low import levels within the same "RCA export industries". In other words, the
Macedonian economy does not imports the products it exports. This conclusion is further
evidenced by the measure of Macedonian degree of intra-industry trade;
 
•  Widely observed (according to widely defined industries - 1
st- or 2
nd-digit levels of
SITC), Macedonian exports display relatively diversified structure. Yet, observed
according to specific products (Table 3 shows 3
rd-digit levels of SITC but the analysis is
performed by 5
th-digit level of aggregation), it appears that the overall export of
Macedonia is concentrated in small number of products within wider product segments;
 
•  Despite the relatively wide overall market dispersion of Macedonian exports, within
certain products the exports are heavily concentrated to few (up to 5) markets at which
each product is sold. In this context, the conclusion appears about the extent to which
the economic relations with the regional countries are important for Macedonia.
 
  4. More detailed conclusions can be gained through the construction of a cluster chart of
Macedonian industries with revealed competitive advantages following the cluster chart model
introduced by Prof. Michael Porter, [Porter, 1990]. The diagram that follows points out that:
 
•  Macedonian industries with revealed competitive advantages are concentrated in only
few areas - 1/3 in upstream industries, and 2/3 in consumption goods. Within the scope
of such wide industry clusters the export products are mostly concentrated in: materials/
metals cluster, textile/apparel cluster, food/beverages cluster and in personal goods
cluster (in this last case such are only tobacco and cigarettes);
 
•  Within the mentioned clusters, Macedonian exports are mostly (almost 100%) primary
goods for further use in multiple-phased production, or for further distribution within the
same clusters (for example, in the textile cluster Macedonian exports are rarely the final
product, they are, within that particular cluster, primary products (inputs) which are
packed and/or distributed). Not any of Macedonian export products is machinery for
production, specialized inputs, nor services (tourism and catering are omitted from this
analysis since no comprehensive data is available);5
 
•  This whole analysis shows the rudimentary character of the international specialization of
Macedonian economy, since it shows specialization solely in the domains where certain
given (not created) advantages exist.
 
  Cluster chart of Macedionian exports









































  5. Further analysis is concentrated on analyzing Macedonian exports from the point of view of
it's specialization - inter-industry or intra-industry trade. The column labeled "GL index" in
Table 3 provides the starting indication about the specialization of particular industries. The
  Materials/Metals
 
  Primary products =  29%
  Machinery =  0%
  Specialized inputs=0,25%
  Supp. services = 0%
  Total =    29.3%
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  Primary products =  35.3 %
  Machinery =   0 %
  Specialized inputs=  0%
  Supp. services = 0 %




  Primary products =  10.9 %
  Machinery =   0 %
  Specialized inputs=  1,04%
  Supp. services = 0 %
  Total =   11.9%
  Household Equipment
 
  Primary products =  6.24 %
  Machinery =   0 %
  Specialized inputs=  0,66%
  Supp. services = 0 %
  Total =   6.9%
 
  Health Care
 
  Primary products =  1.7 %
  Machinery =   0 %
  Specialized inputs=  0,04%
  Supp. services = 0 %
  Total =   1.74%
 
  Personal Consumption Goods
  Primary products =  4.67 %
  Machinery =   0 %
  Specialized inputs=  5.18%
  Supp. services = 0 %














overall "GL index" of Macedonian economy is 0.18, and it shows (only) 18% matching
between the export and import structure of the trade of Macedonia. The conclusion is evident:
Macedonian economy exists as a "semi autarkic" economy with an old fashioned model of
foreign trade specialization; it is an economy with foreign trade relations based on attempts to
sell (export) what it has in abundance and buy (import) what is not produced at all, or is
scarcely produced. The relatively high rate of import penetration (the rate of apparent import
penetration in Macedonian economy in 1997 is 43.7% - calculated according to the data in
the publication: "Gross Domestic Product 1997-1998", Announcement of the Statistics
Bureau, No. 217, 31.12.1999), is due to the fact the economy is small in general, hence many
products from domestic origin do not exist. Yet, Macedonian export products do not meet
firm competition on the domestic market, because they are often not even sold on the
domestic market, but instead are products whose production is result of constructed (under
"the plan") production capacities, and whose market destination has never been quite verified
on the market, and even less induced by the market. This economic structure of Macedonia is
inherited from the previous (socialist) period, and it has not been changed thoroughly during
the '90es. This model of foreign trade specialization can only be qualified as rudimentary and
an old fashioned one.
 
  6. The further analysis in this context, besides the low aggregate index of intra-industry trade,
means detecting Macedonian export industries with higher intra-industry specialisation
(horizontal specialization), and rest of industries with vertical specialization. Then, the vertically
specialized industries are separated to those with qualitative export competitiveness (at least
compared to domestic imports of such products), and to industries with lower export quality
than corresponding imports. The final aim of this detection is revealing the sources of export
competitiveness - qualitative or price competitiveness.
 
  The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4, with "RCA industries" separated into 4
quadrants: (1) industries with "successful" qualitative competitiveness; (2) industries with
successful price competitiveness; (3) industries with deficit in the price competitiveness; and
(4) industries with structural problems. Besides this segmentation, the industries within each
quadrant are ranked according to their importance, not as "pure value" of exports in USD, but
according to the magnitude of their influence on the balance of payments. The data derive the
following conclusions:
 
•  Almost all industries which show "qualitative" competitiveness are either: (a) industries
with very little imports (the products of the metal cluster, marble, gypsum and other non
metals); (b) industries of which the products are exported but hardly at all sold on the
domestic market due to the low purchasing power of the domestic demand, which is
mostly satisfied by imports of lower quality than the domestic production (textiles,
footwear, etc.); and (c) few industries where real qualitative advantage of the exports
over the imports exists due to the specific natural advantages (typical for the tobacco,
while in the case of the cigarettes, beverages, rice, raw vegetables and fruits and so on,
their qualitative competitiveness is only in relation to neighboring countries from former
Yugoslavia, as is shown by the data in the previous table). Hence follows the fact, that
the industries in this quadrant express a sort of "fictitious" qualitative competitiveness,7
qualitative only compared to the quality of the imports, but are industries whose
competitive advantages are also the low-price (cost) parameters.
 
•  Almost all industries where this analysis finds revealed (real) price competitiveness are
products mostly sold in the neighboring markets (from former Yugoslavia), and which
can only be sold as cheaper products on markets near by due to the high unit costs of
transportation (raw vegetables and fruits, cement and so on). Yet, these industries do
not create huge revenues as it would be expected, which also means that there are
unexplored possibilities in this area.
 
•  The industries grouped in the deficit in the price competitiveness quadrant are
"problematic", mostly producing products in production capacities constructed in the
socialist past of the country as parts of the value chains of the businesses in former
Yugoslavia. After the disruption of that market those products remain without
possibilities to be exported elsewhere, and can only be sold on the small domestic
market at prices lower than the similar imports. The most specific industry in this group
is pharmaceutical, which is the only human capital intensive - high tech industry in FYR
Macedonia, but which is only able to sell products on the neighboring markets of former
Yugoslavia and in the EEC markets (Russia).
 
  7. All conclusions of this analysis demonstrate the fact that biggest part of Macedonian exports
is consisted of goods produced in production capacities constructed "under the plan" (during
the socialist past of the country) which, in the absence of other goods, simply have to conceive
current export, at least because of the enormous import needs. It also means that their sources
of competitiveness are week in sustainability terms. Macedonian exporters are stuck at
disadvantageous position in every respect: (a) in respect to the relatively high degree of rivalry
in their product segments on international markets where their direct rivals are businesses of
large number of less developed economies; (b) in respect to the huge potentials for new
entrants due to the weak barriers to entry; (c) in respect to inferior bargaining power towards
their own suppliers of equipment, specialty inputs, and so on, as well as towards their buyers;
and (d) in respect to the threats of substitutes which the dynamic process of technology
development permanently creates. This also shows why there should not be any astonishment
about the weak export achievements, and about the frequent expectations and requests for
currency devaluation as a business survival strategy in Macedonia.
 
  8. Two more topics remain to be analyzed: the combinations of production factors contented
in Macedonian exports, and their quality. Such an insight is attainable by the remaining charts
and tables the annex.
 
  Chart 4 is visualization of Macedonia revealed export competitive advantages by technology
classes of manufactures (SITC 5 to 9) on all world markets in 1997. The classification of the
technology classes of manufactures classifies the industries into: (a) "human capital intensive
industries", subdivided into "high-tech" and "medium-tech", and furthermore into labor and
capital intensive (on Chart 4, which has to be considered from the starting axis clockwise,
those are the first 6 axes counting from the starting axis where the scale is presented); (b)
"physical capital intensive industries" (axis vertically below the starting axis); (c) "resource8
intensive industries", subdivided into strong and weak resource intensive groups (next 3 axes
towards left); (d) "labor intensive industries" (next axis); and (e) "other industries" (last axis, or
the first one counterclockwise from the starting one). The RCA indicator shows in which of the
technology classes the economy reveals competitiveness. In this context, the results clearly
indicate that Macedonian exports within the technology classes of manufactures (SITC 5-9)
reveal competitiveness in the realms of labor intensive industries, strong resource intensive
industries, and within physical capital intensive industries, but not at all within human capital
intensive industries. In other words, considering the industrial products "quality ladder",
Macedonian exports indicate certain specialization in those products at lower levels of the
"quality ladder". Even more, within the group of manufactures the strongest generator of
competitiveness in the case of Macedonia are the basic production factors: labor and physical
capital - basic manufacturing of raw materials and textile sewing.
 
  Chart 5, which shows Macedonian export and import structure by technology classes of
products, indicates that besides exports Macedonia also imports mostly labor intensive
products, and very scarcely products which contain higher portion of human capital. This
means that Macedonian economy, besides not being able to produce, can not also absorb
technology intensive products. A closer look at the structure (which is not presented
separately) of the scarcely imported human capital intensive products in Macedonia indicates
that they are, above all, consumption goods (cars, computers, pharmaceuticals and so on), but
very rarely products like machinery, specialty inputs, specialized equipment, etc. This
information confirms that Macedonian economy is not heading to self-improvement, and that
there are background factors which actually halt this process.
 
  The next set of charts in the annex (from 6 to 11) are based on the same methodology and
type of analysis, and are aimed at revealing Macedonian export competitiveness according to
technology classes of manufactures viewed towards different markets - separately towards the
EU and OECD markets, CEFTA markets, EEC markets, as well as towards "narrower" and
"wider SEE region" markets. These data indicate that:
 
•  On EU and OECD markets Macedonian exports reveal competitiveness solely within
labor intensive products, strong resource intensive products, and physical capital
intensive products. This means that the exports are consisted only from the metal and
textile clusters (basic metals, primary metal fabrications and textile sewing). From these
markets Macedonia mostly imports technology intensive products, but yet this import, in
this case, is not the reason for the unrevealed Macedonian corresponding exports
competitiveness, since such exports on these markets simply do not exist. On the
contrary, exactly the fact there is almost not any immense import of labor and resource
intensive products from this markets in Macedonia allows the export to reveal
competitiveness. This points out the fact that sustained economic relations of Macedonia
concerning these markets have to be created from scratch, and on quite different bases
than the existing ones. In most part these relations have to be based on attracting FDI
from these countries, which can lead to different future economic relations.
 
•  Considering CEFTA markets Macedonian exports mostly follow the same picture, but
also a rather weak component of competitiveness in the human capital intensive products9
technology class is revealed. This is an interesting point, and at most this revealed
competitiveness is due to the rather small imports of goods with higher component of
human capital from this group of countries into Macedonia. Besides that, this market
niche can be important in the future strategic targeting of Macedonian exports, since it
indicates that this group of countries are not too much technologically advanced
compared to Macedonia and, on the other hand, they are way ahead in the process of
their integration into EU.
 
•  Considering EEC markets (Macedonian exports are almost entirely directed toward
Russia and Ukraine), the picture of Macedonian revealed export competitiveness is
completely contrasting: highest export competitiveness is revealed within the technology
classes of goods with higher component of human capital (this is mostly due to exports of
pharmaceuticals), and also in the weakly resource intensive products technology class.
This point indicates that labor intensive exports (textiles) from Macedonia on these
markets practically do not exist, and resource intensive exports, as well as physical
capital intensive exports (from the metal cluster) from Macedonia on these markets also
do not exist. Yet, this is not due to lower level of technology advancement of
Macedonian economy compared to these economies, but precisely due to their even
level of technology development. It appears that such competitive (non complimentary)
relations between these economies are not very suitable for more intensive trade,
especially under inter-industry and not intra-industry relations, as are the existing ones
between these economies.
 
•  The next group of markets in consideration is the "narrower SEE region". In this case
Macedonian exports reveal relatively weak competitiveness solely within the physical
capital intensive and strongly resource intensive products technology class. This fact
shows that Macedonian economy still remains a "raw materials base" of former
Yugoslavia, which was a well known fact during the socialist past. These markets absorb
85% of Macedonian exports on the "narrower SEE region" markets. For Macedonian
economy as very important remains the fact that in this case, besides the not highly
revealed export competitiveness, these markets are the destination of the biggest number
(not value) of exported items. This point as well shows that, due to geographical
proximity, the businesses in Macedonia will find their clustering partners within this
region.
 
•  The last group of countries at who's markets Macedonian exports are analyzed
according to technology classes of manufactures are "wider SEE region" markets. The
picture here is the most unusual and surprising: as it appears, no product of any
technology class of Macedonia reveals competitiveness, for which there are well
argumented reasons. On one side, as all analyses and considerations so far clearly
express, Macedonian exports reveal certain competitiveness within labor intensive,
physical capital intensive and resource intensive technology classes of manufactures on
markets of the more developed ("western-type") economies, and within human capital
intensive (high-tech and medium-tech) technology classes of manufactures on markets of
the ex-socialist economies (not so much towards the CEFTA countries), because
exports related to imports determine such relations. On the other side, the group of10
countries within the "wider SEE region" is comprised of both, more developed countries
(Greece and Turkey, as well as Slovenia and Hungary - which are technologically
advanced compared to Macedonia), but also several ex-socialist countries (actually the
whole group of "narrower SEE region"). Hence, the aggregated outcome, especially in
economic relations based on intra-industry trade and complementary economic
structures, is such that the feasible advantages towards one part of markets are abolished
with the disadvantages towards the other markets, in case they are observed as a totality.
This is the explanation and it does, in fact, points to the typical "mediocre position" of
Macedonian economy in relation to the wider regional surrounding, and a position of
entire lack of real identification and differentiation which is not a very favorable picture.
This also means that Macedonian economy has to redefine and reposition it's economic
relations with the neighboring countries, towards the creation of a structure which can
make this economy as undeniable at certain specific domains. The regional surrounding is
the largest source of clustering partners for Macedonian businesses. Yet, Macedonian
economy has to create some specificity by which it will be "recognized", and thus base
it's economic positions on more sustainable positions.
 
  9. The final issue that remains to be analyzed is the quality of the production factors which
determine the largest part of Macedonian export price (cost) competitiveness. Actually, the
issue here is the analysis of the quality of the labor embedded in exports, since in relation to
physical capital (the technology level of the equipment utilized in Macedonia) and to resources
(the raw materials) the ad hoc conclusion that they can not contribute to export
competitiveness can be almost undoubtedly accepted.
 
  The aggregate results of the labor quality analysis of Macedonian exports are presented on
Chart 12 in the annex. The analysis itself is performed with the use of a taxonomy according to
which the quality of the labor embedded in the exports is separated into "high skills", "medium
'white collar' and 'blue collar' skills" and "low skills". The results are entirely respondent to the
previous conclusions: less than 2% of entire Macedonian exports contain highly skilled labor
and only 25% are contain medium skilled (blue and white collar) labor. On the other side,
74% of exports contain low skilled labor measured by international standards.
 
  When the analysis penetrates deeper certain differences in relation to different markets are
being discovered (Charts 13 through 16): (1) on EU markets the share of Macedonian exports
containing high skilled labor is 0.4%, of medium white collar skilled labor 5.8%, of medium
blue collar skilled labor 12%, and of low skilled labor 81.7%; (2) on CEFTA markets the
share of higher qualified labor rises versus low qualified labor, or the share of Macedonian
exports containing high skilled labor is 2.9%, of medium white collar skilled labor 22.7%, of
medium blue collar skilled labor 10.9%, and of low skilled labor 63.4%; (3) on "narrower
SEE region" markets the share of higher qualified labor rises even more, and here the share of
Macedonian exports containing high skilled labor is 3.6%, of medium white collar skilled labor
25.7%, of medium blue collar skilled labor 8.9%, and of low skilled labor 61.8%; (4) finally,
considering Macedonian exports on the "wider SEE region" markets the average level of labor
qualification is again profiled as in the case of CEFTA markets - 2.8% high skilled, 21.1%
medium white collar skilled, 12.3% medium blue collar skilled, and 63.8% low skilled.
 11
  These data derive the following conclusions:
 
•  Macedonian economy amply uses the high price-elasticity impetus of low skilled labor
for creating low price (cost) competitiveness. This mechanism, in fact, is the only one left
to be exploited in case when all other domains that should induce the same effect are
practically non existing, or are underutilized. Simply stated, an economy (like the one of
Macedonia) which has based it's relations with the international surrounding on the
exploitation of the existing (dispensed) background factors and not on the creation of
contemporary competitiveness factors, in conditions when finds itself with "no exit", and
when other factors (abundant natural resources for example) do not exist, has no other
opportunity except to exploit the part of domestic cheaper (low skilled) labor force for
creating low priced export products.
 
•  The data also point to the idea (thesis) that Macedonia does not possess sufficient high
skilled labor. Yet, such a conclusion can not be hold entirely true, because the overall
labor qualification level in Macedonian economy is not very low. This is a fact also
stipulated in other analyses. The thesis can also be debated that Macedonian labor
qualification structure is relatively fictitious, or that Macedonian formal higher labor
qualification does not finds it's verification on foreign markets. A point can be also made
that the businesses in Macedonia do not utilize sufficiently the higher skilled labor, which
is also true. Actually, all the questions might mean "turning around", and pointing towards
the "different sides of the same coin". The conclusions are not supposed to amaze since
they are concerned with, as the whole analysis has shown, an economy which bases it's









  Macedonia is one of the most liberal among SEE countries considering the regulatory
framework. Macedonia has six Free Trade Agreements, five of which with countries of SEE
region: Slovenia, FRY, Croatia, Bulgaria and Turkey, plus an FTA with Ukraine. There are
ongoing negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania, and it is considered that these
two FTAs could be signed by end of 2001 or during 2002. Above that, Macedonia has
Stabilization and Association Agreement with EU, and Free Trade Agreement with EFTA
countries.
 
  Speaking in terms of Macedonian entire foreign trade relations, among the top twenty foreign
trade partner-countries of Macedonia only four are outside the established free trade area. For
example, in the period of the first six months of 2001 among the top twenty foreign trade
partner-countries of Macedonia nine are EU member states, one is EFTA member-state
(Switzerland), six are the countries with signed FTAs mentioned above, plus the Russian12
Federation, USA, the People’s Republic of China and Bosnia and Herzegovina (with whom
there are ongoing FTA negotiations).
 
 
  Import and Export Procedures
 
  Macedonia is undergoing liberalization of export and import regime guided by WTO. This has
resulted in a lowering of tariffs and the introduction of a harmonized tariff system. [Source:
Doing business in Southeast Europe, Ernst & Young, 1999]:
 
•  Import duties are levied at rates ranging from 0% to 60%.  Special duty may be levied in
addition to the standard rate of import duty, giving an effective maximum rate of 80%.
 
•  VAT is applied on imported goods value together with associated import duties. The same
thing is done for any excise tax which is payable, and for any related costs such as:
packing expenses, transport and insurance costs.
 
•  Maximum import duty of 60% is levied upon items such as: fruit and vegetables, cereals,
alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages and tobacco. Examples of other import duty rates
include fish products (13%), bricks (16%), wheat (20% plus special duty), milk and dairy
products (25% plus special duty), oil derivatives (20%), chemical industry products (2%
to 15%), iron and iron alloys (2%), electrical generators (16%) and clothes and textile
products (35%).
 
•  The lowest import duty rate of 0% is applicable on raw wool, cotton, chemical fibers for
the textile industry etc.  In addition, any equipment which is imported during the first three
years of operation by a newly established company, which has at least 20% foreign
ownership of its share capital, is also exempt from customs duties upon import.
 
•  The weighted average rate for import duties applying on all types of goods is currently
10.5%.
 
•  Importers of certain agricultural products and foodstuffs are required to pay special duty
on certain items in addition to standard import duties, which is justified as protection of
domestic production as well as ensuring greater stability of these commodities markets.
Items upon which special duty apply include: meat, livestock, milk and dairy products,
some vegetables, fruits, chocolate, cereals, bread and bakery products, wines, juices and
tobacco.  The special duty levied amounts of up to 20% of the import value of a product,
and is calculated with reference to the price differential arising between imported products
and the average prices for similar products on the domestic market.
 
•  Export duties are only levied on certain products which are regarded as being of vital
importance to the Macedonian economy, such as certain agricultural products, oil and oil






  Free Trade Zones
 
  Free Trade Zones are a relatively new concept in Macedonia, since the Law on Free
Economic Zones was enacted in October 1999.  There is only one confirmed Free Trade
Zone at "Bunardzik" near Skopje. Two new zones should be established at "Prdejci", near
Gevgelija (for food industry, packaging materials, biotechnological processes etc.) and at
"Novo Lagovo", near Prilep, (for telecommunication equipment, computer technology,
domestic appliances, heating and cooling devices, devices for utilization of solar energy,
engineering materials etc.).
 
  Companies established in Free Trade Zones, which meet necessary qualification criteria, are
entitled to receive the following benefits [Source: Doing business in Southeast Europe, Ernst &
Young, 1999]:
 
•  VAT exemption for products sold within the Free Trade Zone, or for products which are
imported for processing and subsequent re-export;
•  Profits tax exemption for 10 years;
•  Property tax exemption for 10 years;
•  General tax exemption on transfers of property and rights between founding parties and
companies within the Free Trade Zone;
•  Exemption from paying contributions, taxes and other duties for the utilization of urban
land, connection to the water supply, sewerage, heating, gas and power supply network;
•  Land may be leased for up to 50 years, with the possibility of an additional 25 year
extension.
Foreign Direct Investment
In Macedonia foreign (direct) investment is permitted in all sectors of the economy, without
any restriction. No restrictions are imposed upon the type of business in which a foreign
company can invest, and no limitation is imposed upon the amount of capital of a company in
Macedonia that can be owned by a foreign person.  Foreign companies freely participate in
privatization .
In Macedonia foreign investors receive same business opportunities as those available to local
investors, including the right to operate in the Free Trade Zones. In addition, foreign investors
enjoy the same legal and regulatory protection as domestic ones. In order to conduct business
in Macedonia, foreign company can own and acquire buildings, and has limited rights over
immovable property.
In addition to enjoying equal treatment as domestic investors, foreign investors in Macedonia
are entitled to certain incentives, especially with regard to the payment of tax and customs
duties. Profits tax reduction is available for the first three years following registration to14
companies with more than 20% foreign investment in their share capital. The potential profits
tax reduction is calculated as proportionally to the amount invested by the foreign company in
the new company. Equipment imported as foreign investment in a domestic company is also
exempt from customs duties. There are tax incentives for research and development
expenditures made in Macedonia as well.
These facts, considered together with the issues stated in sub-project 1, derive an important
conclusion: despite the relatively explicit and advanced foreign trade and FDI regulatory
environment, Macedonian foreign trade relations have not improved considerably and FDI
inflow is modest. During 2000 (as well as 2001), Macedonian foreign trade deficit has
increased enormously [Source: Bulletin of Ministry of Finance, No 3, 2001]. Total FDI inflow
until first half of 2001 amounts 250 US$ per capita without considering the FDI in
Macedonian Telecom, and it rises up to almost 550 US$ per capita when this FDI is added
[Source: Calculated based on different sources of information on FDI inflow in Macedonia]
2.
It appears that the quality of the regulatory environment is not enough itself, and it has to be
accompanied by appropriate policy issues. Above that, one of the biggest obstacles in
Macedonia is not the regulation itself, but it's implementation.
III. Public Capacities for Policy Formulation and Implementation
Introduction
This sub-project shall try to record the institutional side of policy making which constrains or
(potentionally) facilitates an "outward oriented" developement startegy of the coutnries in the
region. In order to accomplish this goal, we will try to analyse the situation through the rule of
law and respect of democracy, the strategy for funcional market economy and the
aproximaton of legislation, as well as bulding institutions that can carry this processes.
Macedonia is one of the countries in the region that considers the EU integration as one of
their prime goals. This stance can be found in almost all political declarations and statements.
However, our interest here is to see whether Macedonia is taking the right steps towards EU
integration and whether the measures it takes are really headed in that direction.
The thesis we want to prove is the following: although there is no doubt that the desire for EU
integration is a sincere one, the particular steps that the Macedonian institutions are taking do
not have the clarity and direction towards this goal.
The necessary assumption for the integration of Macedonia in the EU goes through a regional
integration within SEE region. Precisely the correlation between these two goals does not
seem very clear in Macedonia.
                                                                
2 It is rather difficult to calcilate the most exact figure on total FDI inflow in MACEDONIA until now, since
there are no aggregated data available officialy, and every ministry or public instutution involved in FDI
issues uses somewhat different methodology.15
The SEE integration is not a goal imposed by a third party, by the EU, it is of a real interest of
Macedonia and the entire region. Therefore, the question is: why the economic forces that
should certainly, even without a deliberate and organized action of the countries, lead towards
a spontaneous cooperation between the countries of the region, have not done so?
It is obvious that this sort of cooperation has been obstructed by several factors such as:
political instability of the entire region and the constant insecurity concerning future movements
in the region; constant change of policy (domestic and foreign) of the countries in the region;
absence of national nor regional institutions that would really see to a deeper binding of the
region; the economic policy is not linked to the problems of regional cooperation. Aditionaly,
despite the liberalization, which can be seen through the average customs burdening and the
new free-trade contracts, the actual trade and investment flows are not sufficiently liberalized.
Additional problem to this are differences in the transition process:    
o  Differences in type and flow of privatization
•  Differences in level of state interference in the economy
•  Divergent development of legal framework in certain countries
  If we let the Copenhagen criteria to led us into our research of the institutional capacities, at
this point we can see that there is an absence of the rule of law; there is a high degree of
corruption in most of the countries of the region; there is a high degree of monopolization of




  Colaboration in the region – not a startegic goal?
 
  We will here treat only the some problems we consider most significant for Macedonia’s
involvement in a more intensive exchange and cooperation with the neighbors. The basic thesis
in this part of our research is that the most important strategic goal for Macedonia is the
establishment of firmer relations with the SEE countries. This conclusion cannot be challenged
by the results from our own research, which shows that the countries in the region have not in
fact developed complementary industries which would actually, through a deeper cooperation,
achieve synergetic effects. On the contrary, the supply of production factors and the industry
structure in the region make these industries competitive between themselves. This thesis,
which is apparently opposed to the results of our research, shows only that the existing
structure of the SEE economies has been built on a basis of a similar structure of production
factors and with a competitive type of production structure. What this production lacks is a
higher degree of specialization and involvement in a broader production cooperation, which
from the present state of the industry or from the extrapolation of the present structure, cannot
be seen. Therefore, we can expect effects from the economy of scale only if there is clustering
of the industry in the region.16
  The importance of regional association for the Macedonian economy can be seen from the
GDP data before and after the breakdown of Yugoslavia. Namely, GDP data show that the
crisis in Macedonia obtained a violent manifestation with the separation from Yugoslavia, and
that the transition process had, on contrary, no negative effects in the usually expected scope.
The negative effects from the breakdown of the Yugoslavian market are far more significant.
2
  This conclusion is based on the fact that the implementation of the privatization program begun
even after 1994. The drop of the GDP reached its bottom in 1995 when we see a beginning of
a certain economic recovery. It is noteworthy that the increase of the GDP after the
privatization is not developing at the usually expected tempo. The reasons are again in the
exceptionally narrow market and the political encirclement of Macedonia.
  The unemployment data best show the problems from the transition.
  The data show that the main increase of unemployment occurs after 1995 (in 1996 and 1997),
when we can actually feel the consequences from the privatization. Together with the
privatization, the companies were restructuring and thus releasing the surplus of employees.
3
  This process in Macedonia is nowadays almost completely over. We here show the data from
the privatization process.
4
  The number of companies is not the same from the beginning of the process, because during
the privatization there has been a number of spin off-s. The same happened with the number of
employees and the capital. The already privatized companies have started investing and hiring
new employees. Still, since the monopolies and utilities were excluded from the privatization,
their restructuring is a source of new unemployment.
  So, we think that the unemployment, as an excellent indicator of the state of the economy,
shows that in Macedonia the unemployment is a long-term problem, which was increased even
more with the privatization. However, it is clear that what concerns Macedoni most is the
delay of the expected revitalization of the economy. It is clear that the political events in the
country and around it are the basic reason for this delay. The limited and closed marked
simply does not give enough room for a complete production restructure of the economy.
  Therefore, the starting thesis is that the association in a broader market is the basic strategy
that Macedonia must follow if it wants to accomplish a sustainable growth.
  The thesis of an absence of clearly formulated strategy for integration in the region is detected
from the analysis of:
•  The Government programs
•  The programs of the political parties
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•  The free-trade contracts
•  The actual movements in the region that keep the economies fully separated
•  Statements of politicians
 
  From all those documents and from the actual movements in the economic cooperation within
the region, we can see that they all repeat the motto for the need for a closer cooperation in
the region. However, the analysis of the free-trade contracts shows that they basically regulate
the “closeness” of the economies in a bit more specific way, but are in fact no actual effort
towards a common market.
  The number of free-trade contracts that Macedonia has signed with the countries in the region
is an additional element of the mentioned “closeness”. The ease with which those contracts are
signed shows two things:
•  They do not change the relationships and do not jeopardize anybody on the domestic
market.
•  The are “benign”, since no actual change occurs after they are signed.
•  They are burdened with legal details, additional regulations which narrow the
liberalization through a lot of administration.
Where do the differences between the declared and conducted policy come from? Very
strong forces in the SEE countries are fighting against the liberalization in “their own” sectors.
In addition, a well-learned lesson from the former system is never to publicly confront the
publicly declared policy. Due to that, we have almost unanimous determination for EU
association and for cooperation within SEE. But, when time comes for arranging new trade
regimes in the region, under the wings of protection of own industry, a mistake nurtured long
enough to become generally accepted, there is a search for technical means for actual
realization of that protection. In that sense, one can detect the opposition of the higher
addministrative officers and the political leadership of the country. Namely, the higher
addministrative officers in the ministries are conducting the negotiations. They do that now in
the same way as they did it before. The powerful domestic companies, which are
tremendously interested, know how to “wake up their patriotic feelings” and the necessity for
protecting an industry that is in fact, with the higher prices of its products, worsening the
economic situation of their own people.
In order to see the discrepancy between the existing regulations and the results from the
cooperation in the region, we are further presenting the elements of the institutional positioning
of Macedonia, as seen individually.18
In order to achieve success in the economic cooperation, the transition economies should
solve the following issues:
o  Establishment of the legal framework
o  Structural reforms
o  Macroeconomic policy
o  Microeconomic policy
From the point of legal framework, it is necessary to regulate (at least basically) the following
issues:
o  Property rights
o  Denationalization
o  Land Law
o  Intellectual property law
o  Property rights trading
o  Contracts law
o  Entry & exit
o  Corporations law
o  Foreign investments law
o  Exit: Bankruptcy law
o  Competition policy
Macedonia does not have only one law on property rights, since the question is covered in
several other laws. The last one was the Law on sale of construction land (which was the
hardest nut to crack from the socialist system). It was passed and is already in use. Several
transactions have already been realized under it.
The denationalization law was passed in 1998, but was absolutely inapplicable. The
Constitutional Court abolished several of its articles and it is now in use for more than a year.
Several real estate items have been returned to their former owners. However, the
Privatization Agency is trying to play a solo role in this issue, and not even one of the very few
denationalized companies has been returned. The final documents are valid, but the
Privatization Agency, against the law, is refusing to turn in the shares which are reserved for
the former owners. The relevant authorities have been alarmed about this obstinacy, but there
is still no solution. The owners are deliberately pushed into extensive lawsuits against the
Privatization Agency.
The Intellectual property law has been in use for several years now. However, it is rarely
applied in practice, especially regarding manuscripts, movies, computer programs and music.
The Bankruptcy law has been in use for more than seven years now. In meantime it was
changed twice in certain parts.19
The Antimonopoly law and the Competition law has never been satisfactory carried on to the
end, and has also not been implemented so far. Even in the Privatization law there was a ban
for privatization of monopolies, prior their demonopolization or at least a regulatory agency
with a transparent policy. However, in all cases, the Constitution regulations and the other laws
that ban the monopolies are simply ignored. In addition, also ignored is the necessity for
creation of a modern anti-monopolistic law.
Anyway, Macedonia managed to carry out an extraordinarily stabilization policy, as well as
was policy of the foreign exchange rate. That was done in cooperation with the IMF. As a
result of this cooperation, Macedonia is now carrying out a policy of decreasing the budget
deficit. For several years now (since 1995) Macedonia is keeping the budget deficit in an
acceptable span. However, in the last year, due to the inter-ethnic conflict, the budget
expenditures have increased enormously and the budget inflows have decreased. The
Government had to propose a budget rebalance twice this year.
As to the capital market, the Macedonian stock exchange was established few years ago, but
only this year one could see a more significant trading with the securities. The cooperation with
Ljubljana stock exchange is promising not only a larger market that these two institutions will
cover, but also a greater cooperation between the two economies.
The market deregulation in ex-socialist economies, is possible only through a completely new
regulation that will arise from the need for deregulation. The accomplishments in this field are
variable. Until 1997 there was a trend in Macedonia of establishing new legal and economic
system that had the deregulation as its basic supposition. However, after that period several
laws were modified, thus returning certain powers back to the state. After 1999 this trend is
highly expressive. The areas that were successfully deregulated are now regulated in a new
manner through which the state is again gaining grater influence. It generally seems that the
awareness for the need of deregulation is very little present both with the leading politicians
and with the general public.
As to the foreign investments in the transitional process of Macedonia, the foreign investors
have relatively early leveled out with the domestic ones. For the purpose of attracting new
investments (foreign as well as domestic), the state made a crucial step in the form of
decreasing the profit tax rate down to 15% thus making it the lowest in Europe. As a result of
this action, there was a significant increase in the budget incom from this tax.
5
Th international trade policy, is created only on the basis of relations of the exports and
imports and the coverage of the imports with the exports. That is being done in the Ministry of
Economy. There is no specialized agency that follows the export-import flows or formulates
the other aspects of the inetrenational economic relations. That was, by some extent,
previously done by the Ministry of Trade. Within the program for rationalization of the
administration, this Ministry was merged with the Ministry of Economy. An independent
strategy for the international relations is not prepared in any institution, or it is done
sporadically, and when it is done, then that strategy is only a reaction to the requirements of
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the budget, or the deficit in the balance of payments. The Ministry of Economy sees its role as
an institution that is only to grant quotas and explore new ways of limiting the imports, which
even more strengthen the dependence of the economy from the state.
For the small and medium companies there is an agency called NEPA (National Enterprise
Promotion Agency), aimed to help the small enterprises in their positioning in the field of
exports, and helping them with foreign loans. However, it is only concentrated on small
enterprises (the term “micro enterprises” fits better). They are not a significant factor in the
economic relations with the international community and with the neighboring countries, and it
is unlikely that they will ever become one.
From this we can conclude that there is no true strategy prepared for the inetrnational
economic relations, and what is done as a program in this area is actually a reflection of other
economic considerations. Simply, although the Macedonian international economic relations
are a dominant form of economic activity, so far, they have not been a base for creation of
economic strategy for the country.
The idea of Macedonia as an autarchic state has never been openly formulated. That can
neither be read from the flows of export and import. Nevertheless, even the publicly
formulated necessity of a deeper cooperation with the other countries did not result in a
creation of a strategy that would be based upon a clearly formulated strategy for a long-term
cooperation with the international community and especialy with the SEE countreies. All that
can be detected is the desire for cooperation with the European Union with one very obvious
mistake, that that cooperation depends on the bilateral relations of Macedonia and the EU.
This lack of formulated strategy for international economic cooperation, and with the region in
particular, can also be seen from the media and the public opinion pools. Namely, the idea that
the regional cooperation is the basic precondition for economic strengthening and moving
towards the European Union cannot be found in the media.
6
Similar was the reaction of the academic circles, which had a remarkably repellent reaction to
the proposal of Macedonia joining the euro zone. The arguments of the opponents of this idea
were that it is very useful that Macedonia maintains certain independence in the monetary
sphere. They here totally disregard the fact that that sort of independence does not exist.
Namely, the arrangements with the IMF are created in such way that the Central bank has
practically no independence. Therefore Macedonia is trying to maintain something that actually
does not exist at all
1. It is hard to accept the argument that this is unknown to the experts,
especially those working on monetary issues
7.
                                                                
6 Exception is biweekly magazine “Forum”, which treats this topic frequently, but its readers public has
been limited to one intellectual circle. Even though “Forum” is an opinion-maker, it did not have a greater
influence concerning this topic
7 Part of this discussion can be detected from the texts and discussions from the conference of the
Association of economists of Macedonia held on November 18, 1999 in Skopje. Extracts from this
conference are printed in “Monetary policy and economic development”. The reactions to the proposal of
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At the end remains the question whether the ignoring of the obvious need of Macedonia for
regional cooperation is completely coincidental. I believe that the ignoring and avoiding of the
topics is not coincidental. Who could benefit from the maintained economic fragmentation
within SEE? This is a speculative question. Here is one speculation. Those are the monopolies
whose monopolistic position would be disturbed with the opening of the borders. The second
group is the organized (half) criminal, which in fact draws the profit from the situation of many
borders and plenty of administration. They manage to make their profits thanks to their
“ability” of “skillfully” rounding the tight, almost closed border doors, and as well the high
import fees and quotas. If this conclusion is correct, then it is amazing how skillfully they
interfere in the creation of the public opinion and how persistently they manage to divert the
attention of the Macedonian public from the topics that are of its interest. The existence of
enormous number of radio and TV stations in Macedonia is sometimes interpreted through the
existence of those groups.
The move toward customs and monetary union which would enter a similar arrangement with
the EU could endanger the position of this groups since part of the national powers would go
over to international bodies. They, if supported by the EU, cold have power enough for the
fight against the organized crime and local monopolies.
The corruption
We will start our analysis with the most important weakness of the SEE counties seen by many
observers. That is the sped of corruption. So far, one misses an organized well-discussed and
well-supported campaign against the corruption
8. The anticorruption attempts have been
limited to activities of the prosecution bodies and the bodies responsible for control of the
economic transactions. These attempts, as much as they have been serious or of any quality,
have not shown any results because the corruption is so big that it outgrows the competencies
of a single sector and its legal possibilities.
The second factor, which has prevented the corruption to become a more serious item for the
activities of both, the governmental and the non-governmental sector, is the constant political
instability of the country. That instability was indicated by interior factors but even more often
by it’s surrounding. Thus the corruption, even though publicly recognized as negative and
dangerous phenomenon, has not become a point of unification of the different political and
social forces that act in Macedonia.
It is our strong believe that a successful strategy for a fight against corruption one has to start
by creating a system of laws, which will be “inappropriate” for corruption. And that is actually
the idea of deregulation, which, in other context, is discussed elsewhere in this text.
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A particular feature for Macedonia is the citizen’s feeling that the corruption is not the biggest
problem of the country. The research shows that the unemployment is considered the biggest
problem of the social-economic development in Macedonia.
But the responses point out a group of most significant social problems of the citizens. Thus,
the Macedonians, apart from unemployment and low salaries, consider poverty, political
instability, and crime as the major problems. These are problems, which could be easily
related to corruption. Namely, these problems together with the corruption and the inter-ethnic
relations (which belong to another field) dominate the conscience of the Macedonians as the
greatest ones. The other social-economic areas are of much less significance for the
Macedonian citizens. Thus, we believe that our thesis that we have to start from the reasons
that stimulate corruption is correct.
9
In ranking of the basic problems of Macedonia, corruption is ranked last in the group of “most
significant” problems of the country. However, the ranking of the corruption as the seventh
biggest problem may include a certain diagnosis that is given by the citizens. Namely, the low
salaries, the poverty and the spreading of crime are the stimulators for the rapid development
of corruption.
The issue whether certain societies are particularly inclined towards corruption is very
interesting. This issue may by formulated differently: whether the circumstances are the ones,
which stimulate a high level of corruption in a given country, or it is the population’s attitude,
which easily accepts this practice. The answer to this question in the Republic of Macedonia
may be reviewed through the following responses.
A7. Imagine someone who has extended cash or a gift to
an official and has obtained what they wanted. How, in






Do not know/No answer 68 6.75
1007 100.00
In order to further examine the value attitudes of the population we asked the examinee for a
reaction to a hypothetical situation, where he is in a situation of receiving bribe. The response
of the ones who state that they would not accept bribe is the dominating one (47.77%). A
third from the population (33.86%) has relativized the refusal by refusing the bribe if  some
illegal act is required, but implicitly responds that s/he would accept money or a gift to do
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something that is not illegal. Probably here lies the potential of the specific method of the
employee’s “silent bribe extortion” by not doing what the administration should normally do. It
is disturbing that 15.39% explicitly states that they would accept bribe. If we add also the
number of those who do not know what to answer, which in this case may be taken as
absolutely hesitant attitude towards the bribe taking, the percentage of the ones who do not
deny that they would accept bribe is 18.37%.
Answer %
I would not accept, I do not approve of such acts 481 47.77
I would not accept, if the solution to the problem is related with law
evasion
341 33.86
I would accept, if I can solve their problem 99 9.83
I would accept, if all do that 56 5.56
Do not know/No answer 30 2.98
1007 100.00
The table shows that the category of examinees, who consider that the one who bribes after
the “successfully” committed act feels pleasure, is the largest one. It could be explained as a
certain degree of permissiveness to corruption, which is appreciated only from the point of
view of “rationality”. Nevertheless, the answers to the next three questions which are similar in
regard to the fact that they express an attitude of non-acceptance and refusal of corruption as
a “normal” way of solving problems, is significantly more numerous. While 28.33% assess the
briber as satisfied, 65.11% from the examinees express different kinds of reactions of
repulsion.
We have tried to pose the diagnosis on the level of corruption of the civil servants to specify, if
possible, the profession or the level where corruption is most frequent.
The answers show that the first five groups of civil servants that the citizens consider
that  “they are all corrupted” are:
§  Customs Officers (35.45%)
§  Businesspersons (27.11%)
§  Doctors (25.02%)
§  Ministers (24.32%)
§  Members of Parliament (21.84%)
A8. Imagine yourself in an official low-paid position and you are approached by someone offering
cash, gift or favor to solve their problem. What would you do:24
They are followed by civil servants in the Ministries, political parties and their leaders, judges,
tax officer, etc. This data shows that the confidence in the ones who are supposed to fight
corruption is very low. In addition, if the leaders are also under suspicion it is very difficult to
gain the population’s confidence in the fight against corruption.
10
The very division of the questions in five groups (everybody is corrupted, most of them are
corrupted, some of them are corrupted, nobody is corrupted, I do not know) creates certain
problems. In order to come up with the rank order apart from the one which states that
“everybody is corrupted” and which probably contains many prejudices, we have summed up
the answers of the first three levels of corruption of certain professions in order to come to a
more credible rank order of corrupted professions in the eyes of the Macedonian citizens. The
table shows that the citizens believe that the degree of corruption is generally high. The citizens
are of belief that the least corrupted are the NGO representatives. Still 60% of all citizens
consider them corrupted.
The citizens consider the doctors as the most corrupted. The customs officers follow, and then
the businesspersons. The next category agree civil servants in the Ministries. If we take into
consideration that it also includes the customs officers and we add that the Health Care
Sector, is the one that persistently avoids the privatization, it is clear that the confidence in the
public sector is very low. Even more indicative is the fact that these groups are followed by the
judges and the police officers, the ones that are supposed to lead the fight against corruption.
We have tried to research these attitudes as much as possible liberated from the prejudices for
certain professions and to relate the statements with the personal experiences of the
examinees. That is the reason for asking them about their personal experience during this last
year. The answers a little bit change the order of the “most corrupted professions”. From the
table given further down, it is obvious that doctors, municipal civil servants, police officers,
customs officers and court officers are considered the most corrupted professions. This again
points out the disturbingly low reputation of those who should fight the corruption. In addition,
the position that the unreformed and the non-privatized Health Care will continue to be the
major source of citizens’ distrust in the system has been confirmed.
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ANNEXSheet1
Table 1 Trade Exchange Between the Balkan Countries in the period 1981-1987
Millions of US Dollars Per Annum
1
Export\Import Albania Bulgaria Greece
Yugoslavia 
SFR Romania Turkey Total
Albania - 15,9 17,0 53,5 23,0 1,3 110,5
Bulgaria
2 10,5 - 47,2 110,5 225,2 63,0 456,4
Greece 8,3 50,9 - 74,1 52,9 38,9 320,7
Yugoslavia 
SFR 49,7 138,0 110,7 - 135,0 54,6 494,2
Romania 26,6 205,9 172,0 124,3 - 139,3 682,9
Turkey 1,3 17,7 174,6 23,0 52,6 - 269,3
Total 96,4 427,8 521,5 385,2 488,7 287,1 -
Sources 1. Directions of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1988, IMF Washington D.C.
2. Statisticeskii godisnik na NRB, 1988, Sofia.
Table 2 Directions of the Foreign Trade (Imports & Exports) of the Balkan Countries






























Albania 31,3 25,7 - - 3,1 1,1 39,0
Bulgaria
2 3,5 8,6 55,1 18,1 1,3 7,4 11,0
Greece 4,7 48,7 2,4 1,5 8,7 11,9 22,1
Yugoslavia 
SFR 3,2 30,1 19,2 11,3 5,4 8,9 21,9
Romania 4,9 16,4 17,1 12,9 5,4 18,0 31,3
Turkey 2,6 30,7 1,6 1,2 8,3 22,3 27,3
Total 4,3 29,0 22,8 8,8 6,9 12,4 15,8
Sources: 1. Directions of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1988, IMF Washington D.C.
2. Statisticeskii godisnik na NRB, 1988, Sofia.
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Chart 3    Structure of Macedonian Exports in 1997 








total export GL index 5 markets with higher share in the export of the sector 
Total in the 5
markets
012 Meat (Dried, Salted, Smoked) 2,90 0,24 0,01 Jordan (74%); GR (25%) 99,0%
025 Eggs 1,50 0,12 0,00 FRY (93%); HR (4%); BiH (2%) 99,0%
042 Rice 1,73 0,14 0,00 FRY  (96%); AL (4%) 100,0%
054 Vegetables (Fresh, Simply Preserved) 17,13 1,42 0,03 FRY(65%); BG(7%); SLO(6%); HR (6%); BiH(4%) 88,0%
056 Vegetables (Preserved, Prepared) 9,07 0,75 0,07 FRY(21%); It(16%); BG(12%); D(10%); HR(10%) 69,0%
057 Fruit (Fresh, Dried) 14,25 1,18 0,00 FRY(41%); AL(29%); HR(7%); BiH(6%); BG(4.5%) 87,5%
058 Fruit (Preserved, Prepared) 2,45 0,20 0,06 D(38%); FRY(25%); NDL(19%); BiH(3.5%); BG(3%) 89,0%
062 Sugar Candy (Non-Chocolate) 5,35 0,44 0,22 FRY(44%); RUS(24%); BiH(21%); GR(7.5%) SLO(1.7%) 98,0%
073 Chocolate and Products 3,81 0,32 0,43 FRY(50%); RUS(25%); BiH(13%); SLO(4.5%); GR(4%) 97,0%
075 Spices 1,99 0,16 0,02 D(42%); FRY(23%); SLO(10%); FR(7.5%); It(4%) 87,0%
111 Water (mineral and natural) and Non-Alc. Bev. 29,72 2,46 0,05 FRY(97%) 97,0%
112 Alcoholic Bever. (Wine, Beer and Liqueurs) 31,91 2,64 0,03 D(51.5%); SLO(22%); FRY(10%); GB(4%); AL(2.5%) 90,0%
121 Tobacco (Unmanufactured, Refuse) 55,91 4,63 0,20 SAD(31%); GR(12.5%); D(9%); FRY(6.5%); NDL(6%);  65,0%
122 Tobacco (Manufactured, Cigarettes) 50,42 4,18 0,05 FRY(41%); AL(33.5%); BiH(7.5%); GR(6%); HR(5.5%);  93,5%
211 Raw Hides, Skins, Excluding Furs 9,17 0,76 0,00 TUR(88%); GR(6%); It (3.5%); D(1.5%) 99,0%
223 Seeds for Other Fixed Oils 0,43 0,04 0,07 FRY(53%); CES(16.5%); HR(9%); TUR(5.5%); SLO(5%); 89,0%
245 Fuel Wood 0,11 0,01 0,01 SLO(87%); FRY(4.5%); GR(2%); BG(2%); It(2%) 98,0%
248 Shaped Wood 7,72 0,64 0,02 EGP(26%); BiH(24.5%); It(13.5%); GR(12%); D(10%); 86,0%
266 Synthetic Fibres to Spin 20,46 1,69 0,04 FRY(28%); TUR(26%); BG(12.5%); CES(11%); It(5.5%); 83,0%
273 Stone (Marble, Gipsym, etc.) 6,44 0,53 0,03 GR(29%); It(27%); FRY(16%); BiH(7%); ESP(6%); 85,0%
278 Other Crude Minerals 2,73 0,23 0,02 FRY(78%); SLO(7%); HR(4.5%); BiH(4.5%); BG(4.5%); 98,5%
287 Base Non-Ferrous Metal Ores 12,52 1,04 0,00 FRY(91%); BG(9%); 100,0%
288 Non-Ferrous Metal Scrap 8,87 0,74 0,02 SWZ(50%); BG(22.5%); TUR(17%); FRY(4.5%); It(2.5%); 96,5%
289 Precious Metal Ores (Waste) 0,48 0,04 0,00 FRY (100%); 100,0%
292 Crude Vegetable Materials (Tea) 4,79 0,40 0,10 RUS(38%); D(17%); FR(11%); HR(8.5%); GR(6%); 80,5%
522 Inorganic Elements, Oxydes, Etc. 8,66 0,72 0,02 SAD(52); FRY(12%); GR(11%); NDL(7%); It(6%); 88,0%
541 Pharmaceutical Products 18,80 1,56 0,29 RUS(29%); FRY(26%); HR(24%); SLO(10%); BiH(6.7%) 95,7%
554 Soap, Cleansing Preparations 8,92 0,74 0,05 FRY(98%); 98,0%
562 Fertilizers (Manufactured) 4,44 0,37 0,01 FRY(94%); BG(4%); GR(1.7%); 100,0%
57 Polythene, Polivynilchloride 9,19 0,76 0,13 FRY(74%); GR(22%); RUS(1%); D(1%); BG(1%); 99,0%
611 Leather 4,11 0,34 0,09 It(39%); FRY(38%); BG(8%); DK(4%); TUR(3%); 92,0%
613 Fur Skins (Tanned, Dressed) 2,23 0,18 0,01 D(48%); BLRUS(41%); BiH(6%); RO(2%); SLK(1%); 98,0%
652 Cotton Fabrics (Woven) 14,91 1,24 0,10 FRY(36%); D(24%); It(19%); GR(9%); HU(4%); HR(3%) 95,0%
653 Woven (Man-Made Fibres) Fabrics 13,93 1,15 0,19 FRY(39%);It(25.6%);HU(5.6%);D(4.6); BiH(4%); BG(4%) 82,8%
654 Other Woven Textile Fabrics 9,85 0,82 0,02 FRY(21%); SAD(20%); It(12%); RUS(11.5%); BG(7.5%) 72,0%
655 Knitted Fabrics 6,43 0,53 0,10 FRY(21%);It(12%);RUS(11.5%);BLRUS (10%);BG(7.5%) 62,0%
657 Special Textile Fabrics, Products 4,70 0,39 0,11 FRY(60%); UKR(21%); It(13%); RO(5%); 99,0%
658 Textile Articles, NES 13,75 1,14 0,25 FRY(32%); D(31%); It(9%); SLO(5.5%); GR(5%);  82,5%
661 Portland Cement 15,69 1,30 0,03 FRY(92%); GR(2%); D(1.5%); It(1%); 96,5%
662 Clay, Refractoty Building Products 4,90 0,41 0,17 FRY(60%); BiH(23%); AL(6%); BG(4%); SLO(2.5%); 95,5%
663 Mineral Manufactures, NES 4,68 0,39 0,06 BG(48%); FRY(27.5%); SLO(9%); D(6.5%); BiH(2.5); 93,5%
664 Glass 3,64 0,30 0,09 TUR(29%); FRY(26%); BG(16%); GR(10%); D(5%);  86,0%
666 Pottery 2,40 0,20 0,12 FRY(73%); GR(6%); BiH(6%); SLO(5.5%); It(3.5%); 94,0%
671 Pig Iron 79,12 6,55 0,00 SWZ(26%); GB(16%); NDL(9%); GR(8%); FRY(6.8); 65,8%
673 Iron and Steel Shapes, Etc. 58,38 4,84 0,02 GR(37%); SAD(12%); HR(7.7%); LHT(7.6%); It(7%); 71,3%
674 Iron and Steel Plates and Sheets 28,56 2,37 0,14 LHT(38%); GR(24.5%); GB(14.5%); FRY(7%); It(4%); 88,0%
678 Iron and Steel Tubes, Pipes, Etc. 12,25 1,01 0,04 FRY(25.5%);D(18%);CHILE(15%);HR(11.5%);GB(7.5%) 77,5%
679 Iron and Steel Castings (Unworked) 4,70 0,39 0,20 D(40%); It(25%);HR(15%);NDL(5%); FRY(5%); BiH(5%) 95,0%
68 Copper, Aluminium, Nickel, Lead, Zink - Profiles, Pipes 94,21 7,80 0,08 SWZ(38.5%);SLO(12.6%);GR(11.7%);FRY(11%);D(10%) 83,8%
691 Steel and Aluminium Structures and Parts, NES 9,18 0,76 0,12 FRY(25%);SLO(20%);OAE(11.5%);ESP(8%);RUS(6.3%) 70,8%
692 Metal Tanks, Boxes, Etc. 2,59 0,21 0,10 FRY(90%); BG(6.7%); AL(1.3%); 98,0%
693 Wire Products (Non Electr.) 2,40 0,20 0,06 FRY(80%); AL(17%); BG(2%); 99,0%
773 Electr. Distributing Equipment 27,00 2,24 0,16 SLO(34%); D(29%); FRY(11%); HR(9.5%); FR(3.5%); 87,0%
791 Railway Wehicles (Parts of) 5,70 0,47 0,18 FRY(42%);It(25%);PL(15%);SLK(4%);RO(4%);TUR(3%) 93,0%
812 Plumbing, Heating, Lighting Equipment 5,05 0,42 0,06 HR(21.5%); SLO(21%); FRY(19%); NDL(16%); D(14%); 91,5%
842 Mens Outwear (Not Knitted) 117,40 9,73 0,44 D(49%); SAD(21.5%); NDL(19.5%); GR(4%); BEL(1.5%); 95,5%
843 Womens Outwear (Not Knitted) 92,22 7,64 0,51 D(40%); SAD(38%); GR(11.5%); NDL(2%); BEL(1.5%); 93,0%
844 Under Garments (Not Knitted) 2,15 0,18 0,65 D(61%); GR(19%); FRY(8.5%); It(6.6%); SLO(3%) 98,0%
845 Outerwear (Knitted, Nonelastic) 18,48 1,53 0,55 D(49%); GR(31%); NDL(10%); SAD(3.4%); FRY(2%) 95,4%
846 Under Garments (Knitted) 10,24 0,85 0,21 D(49%);SAD(28%);GR(10%);FRY(4%);It(2.7%);SLO(2%) 95,7%
847 Textile Clothing Accessories, NES 2,74 0,23 0,43 D(34%);GR(24%);SAD(20%);NDL(10.5%);GB(4.4%);It(2%  94,9%
848 Non-Textile Clothing 5,75 0,48 0,14 D(86%); GR(8%); FRY(2.5%); SLO(2%); 98,5%
851 Footwear 51,47 4,26 0,24 SAD(30.5%); D(21.5%); AUT(20%); RUS(11%); It(7.7%); 90,7%
Total 1082,68 89,68 0,18
Total 0-4: 301,84 25,00 0,07
Total 5-9: 780,84 64,68 0,22
Abbreviations: AL = Albania; AUT = Austria; BEL = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; BiH = Bosnia; BLRUS = Belarus; CES = Czech Republic; CHILE = Chile;  
                        D = Germany; DK = Denmark; EGP = Egypt; ESP = Spain; FR = France; GB = Great Britain; GR = Greece; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; 
                        It = Italy; LHT = Lichtenstein; NDL = Netherlands; OAE = United Arab Emirates; PL = Poland; RO =Romania; RUS = Russia; SAD = USA; 
                        SLK = Slovakia; SLO = Slovenia; FRY = FR Yugoslavia; SWZ = Switzerland; TUR = Turkey; UKR = Ukraine.
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842 Mens Outwear, Not Knit 74,323 7,228 1 664 Glass -0,704 0,838 -0,002 1
671 Pig Iron 78,388 5,137 2 073 Chocolate and Products -2,740 0,582 -0,009 2
68 Non Ferrous Metals 40,243 3,140 3 211 Hides, Skins, Excluding Furs, Raw -1,680 0,845 -0,013 3
843 Womens Outwear, Not Knit 40,850 3,121 4 562 Fertilizers, Manufactured -4,041 0,524 -0,015 4
121 Tobacco Unmanufactured, Refuse 45,173 2,092 5 248 Wood Shaped -5,206 0,597 -0,033 5
122 Tobacco, Manufactured 47,454 1,982 6 012 Meat Dried, Salted, Smoked -26,456 0,099 -0,064 6
673 Iron, Steel Shapes, Etc. 19,027 0,920 7 674 Iron, Steel Univ., Plates, Sheet -3,328 0,896 -0,079 7
851 Footwear 19,074 0,813 8 541 Pharmaceutical Products -20,012 0,484 -0,312 8
111 Non-Alcoholic Beverages 21,559 0,531 9 Total -64,167
266 Synthetic Fybres to Spin 17,586 0,298 10
845 Outwear Knit, Nonelastic 9,007 0,138 11 Industries with succesful price competitiveness - UVexp<UVimp i Qexp>Qimp
652 Cotton Fabrics, Woven 9,444 0,117 12 112 Alcoholic beverages 30,286 19,599 0,801 1
658 Textile Articles, NES 9,153 0,104 13 773 Electr. Distributing Equipment 18,196 3,066 0,407 2
288 Non Ferrous Metals Scrap, NES 8,794 0,065 14 054 Vegetables Etc., Simply Preserved 12,962 4,114 0,184 3
287 Base Metal Ores, Concentrates, NES 6,052 0,063 15 661 Cement 12,086 4,357 0,157 4
678 Iron, Steel Tubes, Pipes, Etc. 5,897 0,060 16 057 Fruit, Nuts, Fresh, Dried 7,041 1,977 0,083 5
691 Structures and Parts of Aluminum 7,250 0,055 17 654 Other Woven Textile Fabric 6,797 3,221 0,055 6
653 Woven Man-Made Fibres Fabric 4,002 0,046 18 655 Knitted, Etc, Fabrics 5,872 1,433 0,031 7
846 Under Garments Knitted 4,117 0,035 19 522 Inorganic Elements, Oxides, Etc. 3,376 1,638 0,024 8
273 Stone, Sand and Gravel 5,499 0,029 20 062 Sugar candy, Non-Chocolate 3,365 2,694 0,015 9
056 Vegetables, Etc, Preserved, Prepared 3,701 0,028 21 679 Iron, Steel castings, Unworked 3,738 2,451 0,015 10
848 Nontextile Clothing 3,590 0,017 22 075 Spices 1,303 2,910 0,002 11
791 Railway Vehicles 3,239 0,015 23 663 Mineral Manufactures, NES 0,509 1,122 0,002 12
611 Leather 3,416 0,012 24 025 Eggs, Fresh, Preserved 1,477 71,397 0,002 13
812 Plumbing, Heating, Lighting Equipment 1,723 0,007 25 Total 107,008
613 Fur Skins Tanned, Dressed 2,216 0,004 26
666 Pottery 1,668 0,003 27 Industries with structural problems - UVexp<UVimp i Qexp<Qimp
042 Rice 1,730 0,002 28 245 Fuel Wood, NES -0,923 0,103 0,000 1
292 Crude Vegetable Materials, NES 0,550 0,002 29 554 Soap, Clensing Etc. Preparations -0,067 0,993 0,000 2
058 Fruit Preserved, Prepared 1,062 0,002 30 693 Wire Products, Non Electr. -0,695 0,775 -0,001 3
844 Under Garments Not Knit 0,709 0,001 31 278 Other Crude Minerals -3,015 0,475 -0,007 4
847 Textile Clothing Accessories, NES 0,347 0,001 32 692 Metal Tanks, Boxes, Etc. -7,884 0,248 -0,017 5
657 Special Textile Fabrics Products 0,140 0,001 33 662 Clay, Refractory Building Products -4,607 0,515 -0,019 6
223 Seeds For Other Fixed Oils 0,213 0,000 34 57 Polythene, Polyvinilchloride -9,242 0,535 -0,070 7
Total 497,194 Total -26,433
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Chart 5. Macedonia's Export and Import Structure by Technology Classes (1997)
1 = Exports; 2 = Imports
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Real GDP 1993-2000 as % from previous year





















average) 150,4 156,3 164,8 172,1 174,8 185,9 200
Total labor 
force 
available 709,8 723,6 701,8 696,2 683,8 681,6 689,6
Unemploy

















average) 251,5 288,2 284,1 261,4 261,7
Total labor 
force 
available 789,1 800,5 823,9 806,6 811,5
Unemploy




































Yes No % (Yes)
1 Employment 695 312 69,017
2 Low income 384 623 38,133
3 Poverty 383 624 38,034
4 Political instability 360 647 35,75
5 Criminal 323 684 32,075
6 Ethnical problems 291 716 28,898
7 Corruption 287 720 28,5
8 Prices 103 904 10,228
9 The Health System 62 945 6,157
10 The Educational System 42 965 4,171
11 Pollution 38 969 3,774
12 Something else 3 1004 0,298
13 I don’t know 1 1006 0,099
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